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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a construction worker, Barry, stopped by police officers walking 
home from work.  In his pocket is a roll of twenty-dollar bills and a white 
powdery substance—left over dry wall from the house his team is currently 
building.  The police officers do not know that he regularly works with dry 
wall, and immediately suspect the powder to be cocaine.  One of the officers 
runs a field-test on the substance, and it erroneously comes back positive.  
Barry is arrested.  With strong ties to the community and with no prior con-
victions, he is able to secure a reasonable bail amount, and makes bail.  While 
out on bail, he actively assists his public defender in preparing for his case.  
He secures employment records, and recruits a number of co-workers to ap-
pear in court and testify on his behalf.  His employer, while concerned about 
the time he is spending preparing for trial, has never suspected Barry of using 
drugs, and supports his claim of innocence. 
One of the conditions of Barry’s release was that he be home every night 
by midnight.  The following week his construction team is having a birthday 
get-together at the foreman’s house after work, and Barry catches a ride with 
one of his co-workers.  At around 11:00 p.m. he is ready to go, but his co-
worker is slightly intoxicated and wants to wait another half hour to sober 
up.  Thirty minutes turns into forty-five, and Barry becomes worried that he 
is going to miss his curfew.  His co-worker agrees to drive him home, but it 
is already approaching midnight.  On the way home, the pair gets pulled 
over.  Suspecting the driver is intoxicated, the officer pulls them both out of 
the car and runs their licenses.  At this point it is past midnight, and the 
 
 * Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 19.  J.D., 2017 Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am greatly indebted to the Honorable Stephanos Bibas and 
Professor Sandra Mayson for their invaluable feedback and support throughout the comment writ-
ing process.  Many thanks to Danielle Fine, Timothy Pfenninger, and Craig Castiglia for their 
advice and input on earlier drafts.  Any errors remain my own. 
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officers decide to take them into the precinct.   
The prosecutor and Barry’s public defender show up at the precinct the 
next day.  The prosecutor has an offer to make to Barry.  In exchange for 
Barry’s guilty plea, he is willing to recommend to the judge that Barry be 
sentenced only to probation.  “If you still decide you want to go to trial,” the 
prosecutor says, “well, then I will have your bail revoked and you can spend 
the next few weeks in jail until the lab results come back and we are ready 
for trial.”  More worried about the status of his job at the construction com-
pany than the probationary sentence, Barry agrees to plead guilty even 
though he knows he never possessed cocaine.   
Now consider another scenario in which the prosecutor simply motions 
to revoke Barry’s bail.  Barry, facing weeks in jail awaiting trial, just wants 
the whole ordeal to end.  He asks his public defender to get him a deal, and 
eventually pleads guilty and is sentenced to probation on the prosecutor’s 
recommendation.  In both scenarios, it was the revocation of bail that ulti-
mately affected an innocent defendant’s choice to plead guilty.   
Much has been written about the pressures pretrial detention places on 
criminal defendants.1  This Comment will explore the pressures the revoca-
tion of pretrial detention can place on a defendant, and what procedures can 
be instituted within the confines of the U.S. criminal justice system to ease 
these pressures. 
Part I of this Comment will recount the history of bail from the founding 
to the Supreme Court decision of United States v. Salerno in 1987.  Part II will 
discuss whether a prosecutor’s decision to intentionally induce a defendant to 
plead guilty by revoking bail will result in an invalidation of that guilty plea.  
Part III will explore the more likely scenario of whether a sincere revocation of 
bail can nonetheless invalidate a defendant’s guilty plea as involuntary.   
Finally, in the event that a sincere revocation cannot invalidate a guilty 
plea, Part IV will discuss potential alternatives to requiring a defendant to 
languish in jail awaiting trial.  The first opportunity to mitigate the effects of 
pretrial detention causing a guilty plea is at the revocation hearing itself.  The 
lack of adversarial testing at the initial bail hearing provides good reason to 
reconsider the initial conditions imposed, and provides an opportunity to in-
stitute proper conditions in light of the entirety of the circumstances as the 
defendant stands before the court.  Another point in which the effect of pre-
trial detention can be minimized is at the plea itself.  Here, if the defendant 
is willing and the parties are prepared, an accelerated trial date minimizes 
the time a defendant needs to spend in pretrial detention prior to an adjudi-
cation of guilt or innocence.   
 
 1  See generally, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Ap-
proaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the 
Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344 (2014). 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF BAIL 
In order to understand the parameters of pretrial detention, it is necessary 
to explore its historical foundations.  Starting from the founding of America, 
up to the most recent significant Supreme Court challenge to pretrial deten-
tion, bail has only ever served two primary regulatory goals: to ensure the 
defendant’s presence at trial, and to prevent the defendant from committing 
pretrial crimes if released pending a determination of guilt.2  Other prosecu-
torial motives run the risk of being considered punishment, and running afoul 
of the prohibition on punishing a defendant prior to an adjudication of guilt. 
A.  Pretrial Detention in Early America 
Pretrial detention in early America was derived from the English model.3  
Early bail decisions consisted of two distinct parts: (1) whether the defendant 
was to be permitted to bail or denied bail and (2) if the defendant was per-
mitted to bail, at what amount bail was to be set.4  In Colonial America, bail 
was a tool used solely to ensure the accused appeared at trial.5  The prohibi-
tion on pretrial punishment, therefore, played a substantial role in bail argu-
ments.6  Indeed, this prohibition lay at the foundation of the United States 
criminal justice system, and it applied to all defendants accused of a crime in 
its courts.7  In the early years of the United States and its Constitution, the 
prohibition on pretrial punishment was believed to provide criminal defend-
ants with a presumption that, at least in non-capital cases, they would be 
 
 2  The latter was not legitimized until the 1980s.  See infra notes 23–32 and accompanying text. 
 3 See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administra-
tion of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 529 (1983) (finding that the English brought the English bail 
statute across the Atlantic and the early colonies applied the English law verbatim). 
 4 Id. at 534. 
 5 See Clara Kalhous & John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing Interpretations of the Bail Reform Act 
and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ Perspective, 32 PACE L. REV. 800, 806–07 (2012) (finding 
that between 1776 and 1966 bail decisions in the colonies weighed factors that were used as proxies 
for a failure to appear at trial). 
 6 See id. at 802 (“Bail in the federal system ‘is rooted in the belief that a person who has not yet been 
convicted of a crime should ordinarily not spend any extended period of time in jail.’” (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 16 (1984)). 
 7 See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of 
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforce-
ment lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).  The Court in Coffin traced 
the history of the presumption of innocence to the Book of Deuteronomy, the Law of Sparta and 
Athens, Roman Law, and Blackstone.  Id. at 454–56.  In my view, the terms “presumption of inno-
cence” and “prohibition on pretrial punishment” are completely interchangeable.  The Supreme 
Court, however, has stated that the presumption of innocence is nothing more than a doctrine 
allocating the burden of proof in criminal trials.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).  There-
fore, I will use the term “prohibition on pretrial punishment” whenever possible to be clear that I 
am not invoking the presumption of innocence as a doctrine. 
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eligible for release while they awaited trial.8  Even beyond the Constitution, 
the First Congress found it important to allow judges the discretion to admit 
bail in all non-capital offenses.9  This presumption held true through the 
nineteenth century, and allowed a great number of defendants to be eligible 
for release pending trial.10 
Capital cases were an exception to the presumption of bail due to the 
grave punishment that attended such charges.  The idea was that if the de-
fendant was eligible for the death penalty, a defendant with nothing to lose 
would have an irresistible incentive to flee before trial.11  In determining 
whether to set bail in capital cases, the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted judges 
to “exercise their discretion . . . regarding the nature and circumstances of the 
offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law.”12  This was a reformation 
of the evaluation states had previously instituted which denied bail to capital 
defendants where the “proof [was] evident” or the “presumption great.”13 
In cases where the defendant was admitted to bail, the next question of 
importance to the defendant was at what amount bail was to be set.  The 
amount a defendant was required to pay was prohibited from being excessive 
by the Eighth Amendment.14  In setting bail, early judges relied heavily on 
the seriousness of the offense charged and, to some extent, the weight of the 
evidence against the accused.15  Taken together, these two factors served as 
 
 8 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 728 (2011).  This pre-
sumption is grounded in the language of the Due Process Clause.  See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, 
THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 104 (1930) (“It is commonly conceded that the pur-
pose of the phrase ‘by the law of the land,’ which was later transformed into the more popular form 
‘due process of law,’ was intended primarily to insist upon rules of procedure in the administration 
of criminal justice, namely, that judgment must precede execution, that a judgment must be deliv-
ered by the accused man’s ‘equals,’ and that no free man could be punished except in accordance 
with the law of England . . . .”). 
 9 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (“[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall 
be admitted, except where the punishment may be death . . . .”). 
 10 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (highlighting the importance that providing bail before trial 
plays in the prohibition on pretrial punishment as a means for defendants to prepare their defense 
and prevent infliction of punishment prior to conviction beyond a reasonable doubt); Hudson v. 
Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) (“The statutes of the United States have been framed upon the 
theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court 
of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment, but may be admit-
ted to bail, not only after arrest and before trial, but after conviction and pending a writ of error.”). 
 11 Baradaran, supra note 8, at 730. 
 12 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. 
 13 See Kalhous & Meringolo, supra note 5, at 806 (recounting that Pennsylvania’s formulation of an 
accused’s right to bail “unless for capital Offenses, where proof is evident or the presumption great” 
became the model for many states) (quoting GREAT LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, ch. 61 (1682), reprinted 
in ANNALS OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE DISCOVERY OF THE DELAWARE 631–32 (Samuel Haz-
ard, ed., Philadelphia 1850)). 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 15 See Carbone, supra note 3, at 540–52 (chronicling the factors that motivate bail amounts and con-
cluding that seriousness of the offense was the most important factor).  Early decisions did not take 
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a proxy for the likelihood the accused would return for trial.  In cases where 
the defendant was accused of a serious crime, the prospect of a lengthy prison 
sentence was thought to incentivize a defendant to flee rather than face the 
threat of punishment if convicted, regardless of whether the charge had 
merit.16  In contrast, the strength of the evidence stood as a counterweight to 
the charge’s seriousness.  In jurisdictions that allowed it, if the government’s 
case was weak, a defendant could have his bail reduced despite being charged 
with an offense with a lengthy sentence.17  Overall though, it was the serious-
ness of the offense that predominated bail determinations,18 and the focus of 
the determination was based solely on whether the accused was likely to ap-
pear for trial.19 
B.  The Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984 
With courts’ history of declining to take the defendant’s financial circum-
stances into account when setting a bail figure,20 wealthy defendants were 
more likely to be able to afford bail.  In response to a number of studies un-
dertaken in the 1950s and early 1960s suggesting that the current bail mech-
anisms were unnecessarily keeping indigent defendants in pretrial deten-
tion,21 Congress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1966.22  The 1966 Act 
implemented two main goals for the federal system: (1) it prevented the ac-
cused’s financial status from causing a defendant to be detained pretrial, and 
 
into account the criminal history, or the financial circumstances of the accused, but between the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, those factors began making their way into bail deter-
minations.  Id. at 546, 550. 
 16 See id. at 542 (criticizing the rationale given by courts that concluded that the more serious the crime 
charged, the more severe the potential penalty, and therefore the greater the incentive for the de-
fendant to flee).  Interestingly, some have argued that seriousness of the offense charged may be a 
better proxy for dangerousness than flight.  See Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (2008) (arguing that seriousness of the offense charged should be 
thought of as a proxy for the public safety factor in bail determinations).  Nonetheless, during early 
United States history it was used as a proxy for flight. 
 17 See Carbone, supra note 3, at 545 (explaining that bail decisions were more likely to be overturned 
if they commented on the strength of the evidence rather than its weakness). 
 18 Id. at 551. 
 19 See Baradaran, supra note 8, at 738 (“Until the 1950s, judges presumed bail for all noncapital de-
fendants and were only permitted to deny bail where there was a risk of flight.”). 
 20 Carbone, supra note 3, at 548. 
 21 See, e.g., CALEB C. FOOTE, STUDIES ON BAIL (1966); Manhattan Bail Project, Official Court Transcripts—
October 1961 to June 1962, VERA INSTITUTE (1962), https://www.vera.org/publications/manhat-
tan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-october-1961-june-1962.  The bail system was dominated 
by bondsmen and would often put bail outside the defendant’s means even if they should have been 
released.  WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 15 (1976). 
 22 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) [hereinafter “the 1966 Act”], repealed 
by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976–87 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012)) [hereinafter “the 1984 Act”]. 
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(2) it prevented considerations other than nonappearance at trial to be con-
sidered when assessing bail in non-capital cases.23  While still permitting 
judges to require a bond, the 1966 Act attempted to make release without 
having to pay money the norm, not the exception.24  The result was an in-
crease in the number of defendants released pending trial.25 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 dramatically altered the previous system 
that only measured the defendant’s flight risk.26  It responded to an admitted 
shortcoming of the 1966 Act, namely, the problem of defendants released 
pretrial committing crimes while awaiting trial.27  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee, while evaluating alternatives, premised its concerns on a study 
which concluded that one out of every six released defendants were rear-
rested during their pretrial release period.28  The 1984 Act set out to remedy 
this purported problem.  Specifically, the 1984 Act permitted judges to detain 
defendants without bond if the accused posed a danger to the community if 
released, in addition to the determination of the traditional risk of failing to 
appear at trial.29  Although detention for dangerousness was available in only 
a defined set of circumstances,30 this was the first time that Congress permit-
ted defendants nationwide to be detained pretrial for reasons other than the 
fear of their failure to appear for trial.31  When compared to the previous 
procedures implemented by the 1966 Act, the result was a significantly 
greater number of defendants being detained prior to a determination of 
 
 23 Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 24, 24 
(1969) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. IV, 1969)). 
 24 Id. at 30. 
 25 See Donald P. Lay & Jill De La Hunt, The Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion, 11 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 929, 932 (1985) (“[B]etween 1962 and 1971, the proportion of felony defendants on pretrial 
release rose from forty-eight percent to sixty-seven percent.”). 
 26 Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1985 (1984) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012)). 
 27 H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541, at 5–6 (1966).   
 28 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983). 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), (f)(1) (Supp. II 1982).  The language “the safety of the community or any 
person” used in the 1984 Act was meant to serve as a substitute for the general concept of danger-
ousness.  See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 12 (1983) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 3142 placed considera-
tions of dangerousness on the same footing as considerations of appearance). 
 30 Defendants were permitted to be detained pretrial if they posed a danger to the community under 
four circumstances: (1) if the alleged offense was a crime of violence, (2) if the alleged crime was 
punishable by life imprisonment or death, (3) if the alleged crime was a drug offense punishable by 
at least ten years in prison, or (4) if the alleged crime was a felony and the accused had two prior 
felonies that fit into circumstances (1) to (3).  18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(D).  Alternatively, defendants 
could be detained pretrial if they posed a risk of flight or obstruction of justice regardless of the type 
of offense they were charged with.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), (B).   
 31 Congress had previously authorized courts in the District of Columbia to detain defendants await-
ing trial out of fear of danger to the community.  District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 475 (1970); see also Alschuler, supra note 1, at 512 n.3 (finding 
that the legislative record shows the authors of the 1984 Act borrowed from the District of Colum-
bia legislation). 
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their guilt.32 
C.  United States v. Salerno—A Challenge to the 1984 Act 
The introduction of pretrial detention solely for reasons of dangerousness 
dashed the hope of many wishing for a sustained decrease in pretrial deten-
tion.  The 1984 Act quickly came under challenge.  The most formidable 
challenge to the 1984 Act presented itself in United States v. Salerno.33   
1.  Factual Background 
Anthony Salerno, the defendant, was arrested with his codefendant Vin-
cent Cafaro on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) 
charges on March 21, 1986.34  At his arraignment, the government conceded 
that neither Salerno nor Cafaro posed a flight risk, but asked the court to 
nonetheless detain both defendants in accordance with the then-recently 
passed 1984 Act, claiming that there was no condition or combination of 
conditions which would assure the safety of the community if they were re-
leased.35  The government argued that the defendants’ alleged criminal ac-
tivities depended on their ability and willingness to use violence in further-
ance of their criminal objectives.36  After hearing the evidence that the 
government proffered regarding the particulars of the defendants’ criminal 
activity, the district court found that the government had established by clear 
and convincing evidence that Salerno was the boss of an organization en-
gaged in violent criminal activity.37  Relying on the 1984 Act, the district 
court ordered both defendants detained awaiting trial because their release 
would threaten the safety of others in the community.38 
Salerno appealed the district court’s opinion to the Second Circuit claim-
ing, inter alia, that the 1984 Act violated the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution.39  A divided panel agreed with Salerno finding that the 
 
 32 See Baradaran, supra note 8, at 752 (“The 1984 Act increased the number of federal prisoners by 
32% in 1985.”). 
 33 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 34 Id. at 743. 
 35 Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE STORIES 413, 422 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 
 36 United States v. Salerno (Salerno I), 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 37 Id. at 1371. 
 38 Id. at 1375.   
 39 United States v. Salerno (Salerno II), 794 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1986).  Salerno rested his argument, 
in part, on the “bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose enforcement lies at the foun-
dation of the administration of [the] criminal law,” that is, the prohibition on pretrial punishment.  
Brief for Respondent, United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 86-67), 1986 WL 
727532, at *17.  Salerno’s other argument was based on the statute itself, which the Second Circuit 
found unconvincing.  Salerno II, 794 F.2d at 66. 
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detention of a defendant charged with a violent crime for no reason other 
than the worry that he might continue the acts he is accused of would violate 
substantive due process.40  Ultimately, the Second Circuit held that to the 
extent the 1984 Act authorized detention on the sole grounds that the de-
fendant would pose a danger to society if released, it was unconstitutional.41  
Even though the Second Circuit agreed with the government that the scheme 
of pretrial detention under the 1984 Act was a regulatory measure, it found 
that the Due Process Clause prohibited such detention without regard to its 
duration.42  Incarceration to protect society, the Second Circuit found, “may 
be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past crimes and 
not as regulation of those feared likely to commit future crimes.”43 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Second Circuit’s reversal created an interesting conflict with other 
circuits.  As Justice Rehnquist would note, every other circuit to have con-
sidered a facial challenge to the 1984 Act had upheld its constitutionality.44  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the 
constitutionality of the 1984 Act, allowing the government to move for the 
detention of defendants when it believed their release would pose a danger 
to society.45  While the 1984 Act also survived an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge,46 the real fight took place in the arena of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.47 
In making a facial challenge to the 1984 Act, Salerno would have to show 
that there was no set of circumstances in which the 1984 Act survived scru-
tiny—a heavy burden.48  Salerno’s primary argument was that the 1984 Act 
constituted impermissible punishment before trial.49  To succeed, Salerno 
had to first convince the Court that his pretrial detention constituted punish-
ment.  The problem with that argument, the Court found, was that pretrial 
detention pursuant to the 1984 Act did not constitute punishment, at least as 
 
 40 See id. at 73 (finding the authorization of pretrial detention as a means for preventing future crimes 
repugnant to substantive due process). 
 41 Id. at 74–75. 
 42 Id. at 71.  The fact that this scheme was regulatory instead of punitive, it turns out, would have dire 
consequences for Salerno in the Supreme Court. 
 43 Id. at 72 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 44 See United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 481 U.S. 739, 741 n.1 (1987) (finding that circuit courts in 
the Third, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all rejected facial constitutional challenges to the 
1984 Act).   
 45 Id. at 741. 
 46 See id. at 752–55 (holding that the 1984 Act did not, on its face, violate the Excessive Bail Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment). 
 47 See id. at 746–52 (upholding the 1984 Act against Salerno’s Due Process Clause challenge).   
 48 Id. at 745. 
 49 Id. at 746.   
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a facial matter.50  Instead, the detention of a defendant awaiting trial pursu-
ant to the 1984 Act was a mere regulatory act by the government.51   
In coming to this conclusion, the Court drew on a line of precedent de-
marcating the boundary between a punitive goal and a regulatory one.52  Fo-
cusing heavily on Congress’s intent in passing the 1984 Act, the Court con-
cluded that if Congress did not expressly intend pretrial detention to be 
punitive, it could only be regarded as punitive if Congress’s intention was pre-
textual, or if its means were excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose.53   
As for Congress’s purpose, the Court found evidence in the legislative 
history that Congress intended detention for dangerousness to be regula-
tory.54  The 1984 Act was passed to identify a small group of dangerous de-
fendants who posed a danger to society if released, and who would not be 
deterred from committing crimes while out on bail by the imposition of harsh 
release conditions or the threat of revocation.55  The Court found the 
measures that Congress used to combat this issue proportional because it 
limited the circumstances under which the government could move for pre-
trial detention to those accused of crimes of violence, offenses for which the 
sentence was life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, and certain 
repeat offenders.56  Further, there were ample procedural safeguards in place 
 
 50 See id. at 746 (“The Government, however, has never argued that pretrial detention could be upheld 
if it were ‘punishment.’”). 
 51 See id. at 746–47 (“[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclu-
sion that the government has imposed punishment.”).  The inability of Salerno to convince the 
Court that his pretrial detention should be considered punishment ended up being the death knell 
to his challenge of the 1984 Act. 
 52 The Court drew on Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
(1979), and Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), and applied a version of the test that mimicked the 
Court’s most recent decision in Schall, but eschewed the more involved factors espoused in Wolfish 
and Mendoza-Martinez.  Salerno III, 481 U.S. at 746–48. 
 53 Salerno III, 481 U.S. at 747.  The Court also held that a measure intended to be regulatory could 
be punitive if there were no alternative purpose to which the measure could rationally be connected, 
and that alternative purpose was assignable to the measure.  Id.  Beyond its statement of this factor, 
the Court did not address it any further. 
 54 Id.  The Senate Report on which the Court relied indicated that Congress meant to address the 
problem of crimes being committed by those on pretrial release.  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5 (1983).  
To combat this problem, the Senate Judiciary Committee thought it would be proper to give judges 
a tool to detain pretrial those defendants who posed a grave risk to the safety of the community.  Id.  
In considering whether such detention would constitute punishment, the Senate Committee drew 
from United States v. Edwards, a challenge to the District of Columbia statute that also allowed for 
pretrial detention based on dangerousness.  430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).  Pulling from 
the reasoning in that opinion, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that the 1984 Act, as 
proposed and eventually implemented, constituted a constitutionally permissible regulatory, rather 
than penal, sanction.  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 8. 
 55 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6–7. 
 56 Salerno III, 481 U.S. at 747. 
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to ensure that only those who were within the regulatory goal would be de-
tained, and that they would not be detained longer than necessary.57 
However, the Court could not end its analysis there.  The Second Circuit 
itself had concluded that the 1984 Act did not inflict pretrial punishment, but 
that ordering pretrial detention solely because the defendant was a danger to 
the community could not be permissibly imposed in accordance with the Due 
Process Clause.58  The Court thought this conclusion inaccurate.  Citing a 
number of instances throughout the country’s history in which the govern-
ment was allowed to detain citizens for a regulatory purpose, the Court found 
no categorical imperative preventing regulatory detention.59  Instead, the 
government’s legitimate and compelling interest in preventing crime out-
weighed the accused’s admittedly “strong interest in liberty.”60  Therefore, 
the 1984 Act’s detention of defendants on account of their dangerousness 
was upheld as a permissible regulation aimed at preventing defendants from 
committing crimes while they awaited trial.61 
Since Salerno, the state of pretrial detention has not changed much.  The 
twin goals of pretrial detention—assuring the accused’s presence at trial and 
preventing their commission of crimes while released—still stand as the le-
gitimate purposes of pretrial detention.  Absent one of those regulatory goals, 
the defendant’s pretrial detention is constitutionally suspect. 
II.  DUE PROCESS AND THE REVOCATION OF BAIL WITH  
THE INTENT TO INDUCE A GUILTY PLEA 
Defendants who are fortunate enough to make bail may nonetheless be re-
quired to comply with exacting bail conditions upon their release.62  A prosecu-
tor who observes that a defendant has violated one of these conditions may view 
it as an opportunity to induce him to plead guilty.  This tactic gives the defend-
ant the option of either pleading guilty or being detained pending trial.  Revo-
cation of bail, therefore, provides the prosecutor with a bargaining chip, one 
not dissimilar from threatening greater charges in attempt to induce a guilty 
plea.  In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court affirmed the prosecutor’s ability to use 
 
 57 See id. (finding that the prompt detention hearing and Speedy Trial Act circumscribed the length of 
time a defendant would be subject to pretrial detention). 
 58 Salerno II, 794 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1986).   
 59 Salerno III, 481 U.S. at 748. 
 60 See id. at 749–51 (finding that Congress’s circumscribed scope of pretrial detention for dangerous-
ness was instituted in a fair manner consistent with Due Process).   
 61 Id. at 752. 
 62 See, e.g., Dan Markel & Eric J. Miller, Bowling, as Bail Condition, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/opinion/not-yet-tried-but-sentenced-to-red-lobster.html 
(recounting popular pretrial release conditions such as mandatory drug testing, attendance of reha-
bilitation programs, and mandatory job training programs). 
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additional charges as a threat to persuade the defendant to plead guilty.63  Ap-
plying the rationale in Bordenkircher to the bail context, prosecutors may believe 
that it is permissible to use the threat of revoking the defendant’s bail to inten-
tionally induce a guilty plea.  There are legitimate reasons, however, to doubt 
whether such a course of conduct is constitutional. 
A.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Tacking on Additional Charges to Induce a Guilty Plea 
is Permissible 
In Bordenkircher, the defendant, a two-time felon, was facing charges of 
check-forging.64  During plea negotiations the prosecutor threatened to re-
turn to the grand jury and seek an additional habitual offender charge if 
Hayes did not agree to plead guilty.65  Calling the prosecutor’s bluff, Hayes 
decided to test his luck at trial.66  The prosecutor made good on his threat to 
reindict, and Hayes was found guilty on both the principal and habitual of-
fender charges.67   
In challenging his conviction, Hayes’ habeas petition made it all the way 
to the Supreme Court.  He claimed that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was violated when the prosecutor reindicted him on a 
more serious charge simply because he did not plead guilty to the original 
offense.68  Unfortunately for Hayes, the Supreme Court disagreed.  To the 
Court, the institution of plea bargaining flowed “from the ‘mutuality of ad-
vantage’ to defendants and prosecutors,”69 making every plea, to some ex-
tent, induced by the promises of prosecutors.70  Despite the additional pres-
sure of another charge, Hayes never lost the ability to make an intelligent 
choice between foregoing his right to trial by pleading guilty, and facing the 
consequences that would attend exercising his trial right.71   
Defendants, as a result of plea bargaining, can avoid “extended pretrial 
incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial,” as well as gain 
 
 63 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). 
 64 Id. at 358; Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 43 (6th Cir. 1976).   
 65 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358. 
 66 Id. at 359. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 363 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)). 
 70 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. 
 71 Id. at 363–64.  Further, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that finding the prosecutor’s actions 
impermissible would do little to protect criminal defendants.  Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
Since it was undisputed that the prosecutor in Hayes’ case could have brought both the check-
forging charge and the recidivist charge before entering into plea negotiations, a prosecutor seeking 
the same guilty plea could have brought both charges, and then offered to drop the recidivist charge 
in exchange for a guilty plea to the check forging charge.  If anything, bringing both charges in the 
first instance may exert greater pressure on defendants because they would likely face increased 
bail, and a greater likelihood that the court would reject the bargained plea.  Id. 
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“a speedy disposition of [their] case . . . and a prompt start in realizing what-
ever potential there may be for rehabilitation.”72  The government, on the 
other hand, can “conserve vital and scarce resources,” and protect the public 
from the “risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at 
large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings.”73  While 
there are certain threats which can destroy the mutuality of advantage,74 bar-
gaining around charges supported by probable cause theoretically allows de-
fendants to intelligently weigh the pros and cons of going to trial, and make 
a decision that benefits both sides of the agreement. 
B.  The Difference Between Bringing Additional Charges and Revoking a Defendant’s 
Bail 
Threatening to revoke a defendant’s bail, however, is not the same as 
threatening to bring additional, legitimate charges.  Bringing charges is the 
method by which the state initiates its imposition of punishment.75  American 
prosecutors possess wide latitude on when, and which charges to bring.76  
Considerations that guide prosecutors in charging decisions are aimed at en-
suring an accurate trial leading to an eventual conviction beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.77 
In contrast, the constitutionality of pretrial detention has been upheld on 
the grounds that it is a regulatory, not punitive measure.78  When determin-
ing whether a government action such as pretrial detention is punitive, courts 
 
 72 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).   
 73 Id. 
 74 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1974) (finding that vindictively bringing an addi-
tional charge after a defendant decides to bring an appeal burdens a defendant’s right to appeal); 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723–25 (1969) (finding that sentencing a defendant to a 
more serious sentence after successfully attacking a conviction is assumed to be vindictive). 
 75 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 87 (3d ed. 2012) 
(asserting that the criminal law’s defining feature is its propensity to impose punishment). 
 76 See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (finding few legal restraints on prosecutorial discretion).  The 
only real restraints on a prosecutor’s election of charges require that the charges he brings be sup-
ported by probable cause, and prohibit the bringing of charges in contravention of the Equal Pro-
tection or Due Process Clauses.  Id. at 4–6. 
 77 See, e.g., U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL § 9-27.420, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-princi-
ples-federal-prosecution#9-27.420 (requiring the prosecutor to believe he will secure a conviction 
by a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015), https://www.ameri-
canbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition.html (man-
dating that there be sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction prior to charging). 
 78 See United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (“We conclude, therefore, that 
the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is regulatory in nature, and does not 
constitute punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.”); Bitter v. United States, 
389 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1967) (reversing a defendant’s conviction because a revocation of bail had the 
“appearance and effect of punishment”). 
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will first look to whether there is an intent to punish.79  If intent to punish is 
found, the inquiry shifts to whether the action in question is reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate government interest, and whether it is excessive in rela-
tion to that interest.80 
Keeping in mind that the twin regulatory purposes of pretrial detention 
are to prevent both flight and the commission of pretrial crimes,81 when a 
prosecutor attempts to revoke a defendant’s bail for the purposes of inducing 
a guilty plea, the regulatory justifications for bail become inapplicable, as the 
purpose of placing the defendant in detention shifts from preserving a future 
trial, to bypassing one altogether.  Without these two regulatory justifications, 
pretrial detention becomes nothing more than pretrial punishment in con-
travention of due process.82  The only conceivable interest that the prosecu-
tor may have is to persuade the defendant to forego his right to plead not 
guilty and proceed to trial—that is, an interest in efficiency and economy.83  
It is possible to view pretrial detention as a bargaining chip which can grease 
the wheels of an otherwise inefficient and overburdened criminal justice sys-
tem.84  Without applying pressure to defendants in order to prompt them to 
plead guilty, the criminal justice system would not be able to handle the case-
load before it.85  The harm inflicted by revoking a defendant’s bail, however, 
is grossly disproportional to the benefit conferred by a mere interest in econ-
omy.  The pressures attending pretrial detention are significant,86 and the 
decision to forego one’s right to a trial must be made voluntarily.87  Subject-
ing a defendant to conditions typically reserved for those convicted of a crime 
for the purpose of efficiency and economy is an excessive use of a power ap-
proved of only for regulatory purposes. 
Pretrial detention is decidedly different than the charging decisions at is-
sue in Bordenkircher.  Where a defendant being threatened with an additional 
 
 79 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). 
 80 Id. at 538–39. 
 81 See supra notes 5–13, 20–32 and accompanying text (explaining the historical background of bail’s 
justification). 
 82 See Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949) (finding that a defendant cannot be sentenced 
to a prison term before every element of the charged crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt).   
 83 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222 (1978) (recognizing “the State’s legitimate interest in 
encouraging the entry of guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargaining”). 
 84 See Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2015 (Magazine), at 42 (describing bail as a 
“tool of compulsion, forcing people who would not otherwise plead guilty to do so”). 
 85 See H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 
105 (1977) (concluding that full-scale trials of more than a bare minority of felony cases would not 
be sustainable given current resources). 
 86 See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text (outlining the burdens that pretrial detention places 
on a defendant). 
 87 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (requiring that guilty pleas be made intelli-
gently, knowingly, and voluntarily). 
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charge can intelligently decide between legitimate impositions of punish-
ment, by revoking a defendant’s bail he is being subjected to punishment that 
runs afoul of the approved-of regulatory goals of pretrial detention. 
III.  INVOLUNTARINESS AND INADVERTENTLY CAUSING A DEFENDANT 
TO PLEAD GUILTY BY REVOKING BAIL 
While a prosecutor purposefully attempting to induce a guilty plea 
through the threat of revoking a defendant’s bail is unconstitutional, in-
stances where it can be proved that the prosecutor intended for the revoca-
tion of bail to induce the defendant to plead guilty will be rare.  The far more 
likely scenario involves a prosecutor’s decision to revoke a defendant’s bail 
with the unintended consequence of prompting him to plead guilty.  In such 
a case, the prosecutor’s actions are not punitive.  Nonetheless, the revocation 
of bail will necessarily apply an increased amount of pressure to some de-
fendants who, but for the revocation of bail, would have taken their case to 
trial.  A defendant in this scenario may attempt to challenge the validity of 
his plea on the grounds that it was involuntary; but such a challenge is un-
likely to be successful. 
A.  Pretrial Detention Applies Pressure to Multiple Facets of a Defendant’s Life 
When a defendant is detained pretrial, the effects can be three-fold: de-
tention can affect the personal, economic, and legal segments of a defend-
ant’s life.  These pressures have a marked effect on the criminal justice pro-
cess and have been empirically shown to cause significant negative 
consequences for defendants downstream. 
1.  Personal Pressures 
On a personal level, the relegation of a defendant to pretrial detention 
rips him from his community and isolates him from the outside world.88  A 
defendant’s relationships with his friends and family can be disrupted, and 
even destroyed.89  Custody of children may be permanently lost, and the de-
fendant can be at risk of being evicted from his home.  While detained, the 
accused’s personal privacy is significantly diminished.  His conversations are 
constantly monitored by guards, his mail is searched, and he is frequently 
subjected to invasive searches of his person.90  This disrupts—sometimes per-
manently—the personal life of a defendant prior to the adjudication of his 
 
 88 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1358 (2014). 
 89 See Alschuler, supra note 1, at 517 (postulating that friends and family members lose interest in the 
accused when they are detained pretrial, often failing to write or visit).   
 90 Wiseman, supra note 88, at 1353–54. 
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guilt. 
2.  Economic Pressures 
Pretrial detention can also cause a defendant substantial financial hard-
ship.  For obvious reasons, a detainee who was employed prior to being de-
tained will not be able to continue his employment while awaiting trial.  This 
has both short-term and long-term consequences.  Short-term, the detainee 
and his family are deprived of the immediate financial support the defendant 
could have provided if he were employed outside of the detention facility.91  
Long-term, a defendant who misses work due to being detained may lose his 
job permanently, even if his detention lasts only a short time.92 
3.  Legal Pressures 
Legally, a defendant who is detained pretrial will face substantial difficul-
ties mounting his defense.  A defendant who is detained will often have trou-
ble communicating with his attorney and preparing for trial.93  Defense at-
torneys, often overworked, rely heavily on their clients to assist them in 
preparing their case.94  While the defendant is detained, however, his ability 
to reach out to prospective defense witnesses or gather other evidence to sup-
port his case is frustrated.95  This inability of the defendant to meet with his 
defense lawyer becomes especially troublesome at trial during overnight re-
cesses where the defense lawyer must make a choice between spending valu-
able hours at the office preparing for the next day, or spending them at the 
jailhouse gaining input from his client.96   
Further, pretrial detention may affect the demeanor and appearance of 
a defendant in the courtroom, which can influence how a jury perceives him 
during trial.97  The regimented living and crowded cells can cause a defend-
ant to appear unshaven, unwashed, unkempt, and unhappy as he enters the 
 
 91 Id. at 1356–57.  Similarly, when a defendant is unable to work, he is also less likely to be able to 
afford private counsel.  Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis—Foreward: Preventive 
Detention —A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 348 (1971). 
 92 Wiseman, supra note 88, at 1356–57. 
 93 Id. at 1355–56. 
 94 See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN 
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004) at 7–8, 17–18 (finding, inter alia, 
that indigent defense systems in the United States were severely underfunded, and caseloads were 
excessive). 
 95 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2493 (2004). 
 96 Kalhous & Meringolo, supra note 5, at 847. 
 97 Michael J. Eason, Eighth Amendment—Pretrial Detention: What Will Become of the Innocent?, 78 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1048, 1065 (1988).  The conditions for defendants being detained pretrial can 
often be worse than for those already convicted.  Alschuler, supra note 1, at 517. 
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courtroom.98  Lack of nourishment, medicine, and exercise can also contrib-
ute to a defendant’s lackluster presence beside defense counsel.99  Altogether, 
being detained pretrial puts the defendant at a severe disadvantage as he pre-
sents his case at trial. 
4.  Effects on the Criminal Justice Process 
While most of these pressures are more severe when the accused is de-
tained for the entire pretrial process, some of these pressures are exacerbated 
when bail is revoked as opposed to denied.  Behavioral science has demon-
strated that the effects of detention are felt most strongly during the time 
period when it is first imposed.100  This phenomenon, called the hedonic 
treadmill, posits that a detainee will initially experience a higher effective 
state when he is initially detained, but will eventually come to adapt to the 
new set of circumstances, lessening the experienced discomfort.101  In the bail 
context, this means that the defendant whose bail is revoked will feel the 
maximum level of discomfort at least twice.  First, he will experience it when 
he is initially arrested and detained awaiting arraignment;102 then he will 
again experience it when his bail is revoked.103  Defendants who are twice 
detained may experience greater sting from the physical and psychological 
discomfort of a cramped cell and lack of privacy than the defendant who is 
left detained for the entire pretrial period.104  The defendant’s family may 
experience more difficulties adjusting to life without the defendant’s income 
if they are lulled into the false hope that, once released on bail, his earnings 
will recommence.  Finally, his legal defense may be harmed if the defense 
 
 98 Patricia Wald, Foreward: Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
631, 632 (1964). 
 99 Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 944–45 (1970). 
 100 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 187–88 (finding that the duration of a sentence may not have the 
desired deterrent effect because the detainee will adapt to his surroundings and cause the “bite” of 
detention to neutralize). 
 101 See id. (“[P]eople who move from a neutral affective state to a set of circumstances that initially 
produce a higher affective state come to adapt to that new set of circumstances, and experience it 
as a lapsing back to affective neutrality.”). 
 102 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (allowing a defendant to be detained 
for up to forty-eight hours before arraignment occurs).   
 103 It likely will not take long for a defendant to become reacclimated to society to the point where he 
will feel the full sting of detention when his bail is revoked.  Cf. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 
110 (2010) (“It seems to us that [release] period is 14 days.  That provides plenty of time for the 
suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off 
any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.”). 
 104 This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the physical conditions of confinement are often worse 
for untried defendants who are detained in local jails rather than in penitentiaries.  Alschuler, supra 
note 1, at 517. 
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strategy constructed while the defendant is out on bail requires both the de-
fendant and his lawyer take certain steps.105  If the defendant’s bail is revoked 
prior to his role being completed, then the time the defendant’s lawyer spent 
working on that avenue of defense will be squandered if he is unable to find 
the resources to complete the defendant’s role himself. 
5.  The Empirical Effects of Pretrial Detention 
The pressures of pretrial detention persist, albeit at different intensities, 
throughout the entire period the accused is detained awaiting trial, which for 
many can take months.106  Studies have shown that the effects of pretrial de-
tention have real-life downstream consequences for defendants.  There is am-
ple anecdotal evidence to suggest that pretrial detention can cause an otherwise 
innocent defendant to plead guilty.107  Recently, however, empirical studies 
using quasi-experimental design have gone beyond just anecdotal evidence to 
show the measurable downstream effects pretrial detention can have on an 
individual defendant.108  One study, analyzing the effect of pretrial detention 
on defendants in Philadelphia, found that defendants detained pretrial were 
thirteen percent more likely to receive a guilty disposition.109  The difference, 
according to the author, was due to defendants deciding to plead guilty when 
they were otherwise likely to be acquitted or have their charges dropped.110   
Pretrial detention also seems to place a substantial burden on those least 
able to bear it.  Another study analyzing the effect of pretrial detention in 
Harris County, Texas found detained defendants 25% more likely to plead 
 
 105 This could be something as simple as an alibi defense.  In such a scenario, the defendant’s lawyer 
may research the legal issues, but depend on the defendant to find witnesses to support his defense. 
 106 Wiseman, supra note 88, at 1354. 
 107 See, e.g., Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 2016) (criticizing the use of pretrial detention 
against defendants posing little risk or public safety risk as forcing defendants to accept a plea in 
order to be set free); Pinto, supra note 84, at 42 (characterizing bail as a tool used to push criminal 
cases towards a guilty plea). 
 108 Including those detailed below, there are at least four other empirical studies using quasi-experi-
mental design to assess the downstream effects of pretrial detention.  See Paul Heaton, Sandra May-
son & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. 
REV. 711, 714–15 (2017); Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention 
on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22511, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22511; Arpit 
Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge 
Randomization 2 (Colum. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 531, 2016), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2774453; Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case 
Outcomes: Evidence from NYC Arraignments 3 (Nov. 9, 2016), http://home.uchicago.edu/~npope/pre-
trial_paper.pdf; Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 
3 (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2777615. 
 109 Stevenson, supra note 108, at 3. 
 110 Id. 
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guilty than otherwise similarly situated defendants.111  These defendants were 
also more likely to receive sentences that required jail time.112  The effects 
were further compounded by the finding that defendants with income in the 
bottom 10% of the population were eight percentage points more likely to be 
detained pretrial than the average defendant.113  These are defendants who 
stand to benefit the most from pretrial release.  Their households are in great-
est need of the income they could provide if they were able to return to work, 
and they are likely to be represented by an overworked public defender.114   
Furthermore, defendants who are detained pretrial may feel greater pres-
sure to plead guilty to the extent the time they spent detained pretrial will 
allow them to be released with time served.115  This is especially true for first-
time offenders whose sentences are least likely to carry a prison sentence.  In 
part because of the relative increased psychological and emotional discom-
fort placed on those who are not accustomed to pretrial detention, some de-
tainees respond differently after being detained a second or successive 
time.116  These pressures caused first-time offenders, and those who were 
least acclimated to detention, to be more likely to plead guilty in order to cut 
their detention short.117 
This evidence is alarming.  A primary goal of any criminal justice system 
should be to ensure that the guilty, and only the guilty, face criminal punish-
ment.  If these above studies are correct, and it is the pressures of pretrial 
detention that cause a defendant to plead guilty rather than consciousness of 
guilt, then the criminal justice system is failing.  A pretrial detention system 
which facilitates the guilty plea and subsequent punishment of innocent de-
fendants is a pretrial detention scheme that needs to be reworked. 
B.  Due Process and Voluntariness 
Guilty pleas are serious business, and involve the waiver of a number of 
 
 111 Heaton et al., supra note 108, at 717. 
 112 Id. at 747. 
 113 See id. at 738 (using the defendant’s zip code as a proxy for income and finding that defendants in 
the lowest income decile were eight percentage points more likely to be detained than other de-
fendants with similarly assigned bail).  Alternatively, those in the top 10% were nine percentage 
points less likely to be detained pretrial.  Id. 
 114  See supra note 94 and accompanying text (citing an ABA report supporting the claim that public 
defendants are often overworked). 
 115 See Pinto, supra note 84, at 42–43 (explaining how a defendant detained pretrial can be pressured to 
plead guilty in order to be released on the same day, getting credit for the time he spent detained 
pretrial); Heaton et al., supra note 108, at 747–748 (“[D]etention induces guilty pleas . . . [by] caus-
ing some defendants to ‘pre-serve’ their expected sentences, so that contesting guilt has little ulti-
mate effect on the amount of punishment . . . .”). 
 116 Heaton et al., supra note 108, at 748–49.   
 117 Id. at 749. 
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rights that are foundational to our system of justice.  In one sense the defend-
ant is forfeiting his right to silence by bearing witness against himself; in an-
other he is foregoing his right to a jury trial.118  Given their grave importance, 
pleas induced by “actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion 
overbearing the will of the defendant” are involuntary, and cannot stand.119   
In considering voluntariness it must be admitted up front that, to some 
extent, every guilty plea is coerced.120  Indeed, it is unlikely that any defend-
ant would plead guilty if there were not some promise of leniency or ad-
vantage in return.  If the penalty for pleading guilty were equal to going to 
trial, the defendant would have nothing to lose by rolling the dice on the 
chance of an acquittal.  It is the mutuality of advantage to both the defendant 
and the prosecutor that makes guilty pleas possible.121  Just because the de-
fendant is afforded some form of relief from an otherwise precarious situation 
does not mean that a plea should be invalidated; to hold otherwise would 
result in invalidating every guilty plea.  There is a point, however, where the 
defendant’s will becomes overborne, and a guilty plea can no longer be con-
sidered a voluntary act.   
A plea’s voluntariness is a context-dependent inquiry which takes into ac-
count all of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s decision to plead 
guilty.122  Some circumstances that may counsel towards a finding of involun-
tariness include ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducement, 
and subtle or blatant threats.123  While these factors all bear on involuntari-
ness, the analysis lends itself to a sliding scale.  For example, at issue in Brady 
v. United States was a constitutionally invalid sentencing scheme which tended 
to encourage defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the possible imposi-
tion of the death penalty.124  Brady claimed that his guilty plea was coerced 
and should be invalidated because the fear of death motivated his decision to 
plead guilty.125  The Court, however, disagreed.  It refused to accept a per se 
 
 118 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 119 Id. at 750. 
 120 See United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988) (“All pleas of guilty are the result 
of some pressure or influences on the mind of the defendant.” (quoting Schnautz v. Beto, 416 F.2d 
214, 215 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 121 Briefly, for a defendant whose chance of acquittal is slim, he can have his exposure reduced, begin 
the correctional process immediately, and eliminate the practical burdens of a public trial.  Brady, 
397 U.S. at 751.  For the prosecutor, the assurance of liability, the conservation of scarce govern-
ment resources, and the prompt imposition of punishment can all motivate the prosecutor in com-
ing to the prompt resolution of criminal matters.  Id. at 752. 
 122 Id. at 742. 
 123 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969). 
 124 Brady, 397 U.S. at 745–46.  Under the scheme, it was only possible to be sentenced to death if a 
jury so recommended.  Id.  Therefore, if the defendant pleaded guilty there would be no jury de-
termination, and thus no opportunity for the death penalty to be imposed.   
 125 Id. at 746. 
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rule that a guilty plea is involuntary whenever the defendant desires to accept 
the certainty of a lesser penalty rather than face the possibility of a greater one 
following trial.126  Instead, the Court found Brady able to rationally weigh the 
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.127  Prior 
to Brady’s decision to plead guilty, his co-defendant had confessed and was 
prepared to testify against him.128  According to the Court, it was this devel-
opment, rather than the possibility of the death penalty, that prompted Brady 
to plead.129  Taking into account the entirety of the circumstances, the Court 
found Brady aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of 
any commitments made to him, and affirmed his guilty plea.130 
On the other end of the spectrum was Machibroda v. United States where 
the prosecutor allegedly promised Machibroda multiple times that he would 
not receive a sentence in excess of twenty years if he pleaded guilty.131  After 
pleading guilty, Machibroda was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.132  
Without deciding the factual issue of whether the prosecutor actually made 
those promises, the Court found that if such promises were in fact made, they 
would deprive Machibroda’s guilty plea of its voluntary nature and open it 
to collateral attack.133  While the Court was not specific, it is intuitive that a 
false-promise with respect to the possible sentence associated with pleading 
guilty would make a plea involuntary.  Where Brady focused on the ability of 
a defendant to consult with counsel and weigh the possible consequences of 
going to trial as opposed to pleading guilty,134 Machibroda was given no such 
opportunity.  If Machibroda had been able to sit down with his attorney and 
consider the pros and cons of pleading guilty, the prosecutor’s false-promise 
would have skewed his calculation.  Thus, as the Court determined, the plea 
would have been involuntary.135 
Other cases further reinforce the purpose of the test being the defendant’s 
ability to weigh the alternatives of going to trial against pleading guilty.  In 
North Carolina v. Alford, the Court upheld a plea as voluntary despite the fact 
that Alford never admitted his guilt.136  The Court reasoned that he was able 
 
 126 Id. at 751. 
 127 Id. at 750. 
 128 Id. at 749. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 755. 
 131 368 U.S. 487, 489 (1962).  Further, it was alleged that the defendant was not allowed to discuss the 
promises with his counsel.  Id. at 489–90. 
 132 Id. at 488. 
 133 Id. at 493. 
 134 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (finding that the defendant’s plea was voluntary because he was able to 
“rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty”). 
 135 Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493. 
 136 400 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1970). 
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to weigh the risks of going to trial even if he maintained his innocence.137  
Further, a plea entered because counsel is unprepared for trial is involun-
tary.138  Ineffective assistance of counsel would surely make it impossible for 
a defendant to fully consider if it were beneficial for him to plead guilty.139 
Therefore, defendants who would claim that their revocation of bail 
made their guilty plea involuntary face a difficult task.  They will have to 
show that the revocation of their bail altered their ability to make an intelli-
gent calculus in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.140  To the defendant 
detained pretrial, the consequences of going to trial and the consequences of 
pleading guilty are set out before him.  Assuming the defendant has compe-
tent counsel, he is aware of what his potential exposure will be if he decides 
to plead guilty, and he is aware of his potential exposure if he goes to trial.  
Furthermore, the defendant is aware that if he decides to go to trial, there is 
a good chance he will continue to be detained for the remainder of his case. 
The pressures that are exerted by his pretrial detention, while significant 
and arguably harsh, are regulatory measures set forth by the legislature in 
order to facilitate the resolution of criminal matters.  It does not work to de-
ceive or mislead the defendant when he is calculating the risks and advantages 
of taking his case to trial.  While the defendant’s calculus may, as a practical 
matter, be influenced by his pretrial detention, such detention is no more co-
ercive to his plea than a rule of evidence allowing his co-defendant to serve as 
a witness against him.  In either circumstance, the measure is meant to ensure 
that the criminal process works.  Pretrial detention is meant to ensure the de-
fendant appears at trial and does not commit further crimes while in the in-
terim period.141  Alternatively, rules of evidence are meant to make the accu-
racy of the fact-finding processes more efficient.142  Defendants detained 
 
 137 See id. at 37–38 (finding that the strong evidence against Alford warranted his guilty plea, and that 
he could consent to the imposition of a prison sentence despite maintaining innocence). 
 138 United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 139 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at the plea bargaining stage.  See Lafler v. Cooper, 
566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (requiring that defendants have the assistance of effective counsel when 
considering whether to accept a guilty plea).  This is because the complexities that attend the plea 
bargain context require the expertise of a lawyer to navigate.  See id. at 165 (finding that counsel is 
guaranteed at critical stages where a defendant cannot be thought to make decisions without coun-
sel’s advice).  If counsel is not prepared for trial, then a defendant cannot properly consider the pros 
and cons of going to trial, and thus his calculations are skewed. 
 140 The Court in Brady also explained that “actual or threatened physical harm or [ ] mental coercion 
overbearing the will of the defendant” would invalidate a guilty plea.  Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 750 (1970).  If the prosecution were to use the threat of bail to intentionally extract a plea, 
Brady would support invalidating such a plea.  Id. at 758. 
 141 See supra notes 5, 54–57 and accompanying text (identifying the purposes of bail as ensuring the 
accused’s presence at trial and preventing further crimes from being committed while awaiting 
trial). 
 142 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 
307–308 (1994) (opining that the rules of evidence strike a balance between accuracy and legal 
158 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
pretrial have not been deprived of their ability to rationally weigh the conse-
quences of their choice.  The fact that the defendant is forced to make a diffi-
cult decision is “‘an inevitable’—and permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate 
system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.’”143 
IV.  COMBATING GUILTY PLEAS FROM INNOCENT DEFENDANTS  
THAT FOLLOW ON THE HEELS OF BAIL REVOCATION 
Even if a guilty plea following the revocation of a defendant’s bail is vol-
untary as a constitutional matter, if bail revocations are serving as a vehicle 
to induce innocent defendants to plead guilty, a properly functioning crimi-
nal justice system should not only take note, but should institute measures to 
minimize the incidence of guilty pleas by innocent defendants.  An initial 
reaction may be to encourage the rejection of guilty pleas when the judge 
fears it may be done under the coercion of pretrial detention.144  Applying a 
more rigorous standard to the prosecution’s alleged factual basis may, at first 
glance, seem to effectively minimize the risk of innocent pleas, but the prac-
tical problems that follow rejecting guilty pleas of detained defendants make 
this solution unworkable.145 
Instead, an approach is needed that alleviates the pressures of pretrial 
detention while continuing to ensure that the twin goals of pretrial detention 
are met.  One way to attain this goal is to, once again, release the defendant 
on bail with different or more stringent conditions.  Another potential solu-
tion would be to fast-track the defendant’s trial date.146 
 
costs). 
 143 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S 357, 364 (1978) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 
31 (1973)). 
 144 See John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent 
Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 123 (1977) (finding that federal trial court judges possess suffi-
cient discretion to reject a guilty plea even if a factual basis for the plea technically exists). 
 145 For instance, it leaves the defendant, whose guilty plea is rejected because of an inadequate factual 
basis, to wallow in pretrial detention while awaiting trial—the precise consequence his guilty plea 
was meant to avoid.  In some instances, it may even be in the defendant’s best interest to be allowed 
to plead guilty despite the fact that he is innocent.  See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1117, 1133–35 (2008) (arguing that the process costs of maintaining an innocent plea may 
not be practical for innocent defendants whose post-trial sentence would be less than their pretrial 
detention). 
 146 The solutions for which I advocate in this Part are reserved for defendants who were in technical 
violation of their pretrial release orders.  This would include violations such as missing curfew, being 
late or missing a drug screening appointment, or skipping anger management classes.  These types 
of violations account for approximately 77% of federal bail revocations.  See THOMAS H. COHEN, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010, at 13 (2012) (finding that 17% of all 
federal defendants released pretrial committed technical violations, while 4% were rearrested on 
new offenses, and 1% failed to make court appearances).  Defendants who either fail to appear at 
a hearing, or are properly rearrested while on pretrial release would either be a flight risk in the 
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A.  Considering a Second Round of Pretrial Release 
The most direct way to alleviate the pressures of pretrial detention for a 
defendant prepared to plead guilty due to the effects of being detained is to 
release him with a more tailored set of release conditions.  Initial bail hearings 
chronically occur on the fly, and while a defendant’s right to counsel has 
typically attached by the time of the initial bail hearing,147 there is no con-
sensus on whether bail hearings are a critical stage which would require 
counsel to be appointed and present.148  Guaranteeing counsel’s presence at 
a revocation proceeding will provide the advocacy necessary to ensure that 
the adversarial process functions, leading to a more properly tailored set of 
release conditions.  Judges confronted with a defendant who is in technical 
violation of his bail conditions should be open to considering a modification 
of the original release conditions rather than presuming that the defendant’s 
bail should be unequivocally revoked.   
1.  Defendants Should Have Counsel Present During Bail Revocation Proceedings 
Defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches “at the first ap-
pearance before a judicial officer at which [the] defendant is told of the for-
mal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty.”149  
Upon attachment, counsel must be appointed in time to be present and ef-
fective at any critical stage of the criminal proceedings.150  A critical stage 
occurs when “potential substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights in-
heres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel [will] help 
avoid that prejudice.”151  The Court has most recently described critical 
stages as “proceedings between an individual and agents of the State . . . that 
amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at which counsel would help the ac-
cused ‘in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his adversary.’”152  With 
the rising importance of the criminal pretrial process, if a defendant does not 
 
case of failing to appear, or be a danger to the community in the case of being rearrested.  In such 
cases, pretrial detention would be more appropriate, and would meet the twin aims of pretrial de-
tention articulated in Salerno.  United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 481 U.S. 739, 761 (1987). 
 147 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (finding that the right to counsel attaches 
at “the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation 
against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty”). 
 148 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (requiring counsel to be appointed and present 
at critical stages of critical proceedings); Heaton et al., supra note 108, at 736–38 (detailing the var-
ying ways jurisdictions deal with appointed counsel at bail hearings). 
 149 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 194. 
 150 Id. at 212. 
 151 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). 
 152 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 n.16 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312–
13 (1973)). 
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have counsel at these critical stages, the eventual trial may end up being noth-
ing more than a formality.153  Taken together, when a particular proceeding 
is sufficiently complex that a lawyer would help a criminal defendant in nav-
igating the proceeding, and the ramifications are sufficient to prejudice the 
defendant’s trial, counsel must be present and effective. 
Arguably, the high stakes of the initial bail hearing present a strong start-
ing point for deeming it a critical stage, and requiring counsel’s presence.  
However, it is perhaps the rather simple nature of that first bail hearing—
often taking into account little more than the crimes charged and the defend-
ant’s criminal history154—which has led to disparate treatment of whether 
defense counsel’s presence is compulsory.155  Still, the Court has acknowl-
edged that counsel can be influential on bail matters,156 and empirical studies 
have shown that defense counsel can have significant effects on pretrial re-
lease decisions.157  With regard to revocation hearings, in contrast to initial 
bail hearings, states have begun to conduct these hearings as full-blown ad-
versarial proceedings, making the need for counsel’s presence even more pro-
nounced.158  In the likely event that direct and cross examination of witnesses 
is necessary, a defendant will find it difficult to perform these functions with-
out counsel.  The complex nature of revocation proceedings requires a law-
yer’s expertise to provide the defendant with a chance to effectively meet the 
prosecution’s allegations and arguments.  Furthermore, the downstream con-
sequences of a bail revocation have the propensity to significantly prejudice 
the defendant’s future trial.159  The intricacies of increasingly adversarial rev-
ocation proceedings, combined with the propensity for counsel’s advocacy to 
impact bail decisions, and the significant prejudice a defendant may face 
 
 153 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 (“[T]oday’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations 
of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the 
accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”). 
 154 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Do Prosecutors Really Matter?: A Proposal to Ban One-Sided Bail Hearings, 
44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1161, 1169 (2016) (criticizing the practice in many jurisdictions of setting bail 
according to a schedule based on the charged offense and the defendant’s criminal history). 
 155 Heaton et al., supra note 108, at 773–74 (“[O]nly ten states uniformly provided counsel at an ac-
cused’s first appearance.  Ten states uniformly provided no counsel.  The remaining thirty ap-
pointed counsel ‘in select counties only.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 156 Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9. 
 157 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.1(c), at 16–17 (4th ed. 2015) (finding that 75% of 
represented defendants were released on their own recognizance compared to only 25% of non-
represented defendants).  One study in particular showed that the recommendations of the prose-
cutor and the defense attorney were the only two factors that could predict bail outcomes.  See Ebbe 
B. Ebbeson & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making and Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting 
of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 814–15 (1975) (finding that judges rely primarily 
only on the recommendations of prosecutors and defense attorneys in setting bail). 
 158 See State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 309 n.6 (Tenn. 2015) (citing to multiple jurisdictions which 
require adversarial bail revocation proceedings). 
 159 See supra Part III.A. (describing the pressures of pretrial detention). 
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without counsel, builds a strong foundation for deeming bail revocation hear-
ings a critical stage for which counsel should be provided.160 
2.  Effective Counsel’s Impact on a Receptive Judge at Revocation Proceedings 
Having counsel present at revocation hearings will allow arguments to be 
made that may have been overlooked at the initial bail hearing.  Understand-
ing the pertinent factors judges consider in their bail decisions, counsel can 
bring relevant facts that are specific to a client’s background to the court’s 
attention, and request potential bail conditions in a way that a defendant 
unaware of judicial proceedings, let alone pretrial detention proceedings, 
cannot.161   
While there is some weight to be afforded against a defendant who 
“thumbs his nose” at the orders of a court,162 the lack of adversarial rigor, 
and the general inability of a defendant to effectively advocate for himself 
should prompt a prudent judge to be willing to reconsider the initial bail or-
der.  While it is typically within the trial court’s discretion to modify or revoke 
a defendant’s bail,163 that discretion should be exercised with thorough 
care.164  A revocation that is not aimed at either ensuring the defendant’s 
presence at trial, or the safety of the community, would be an improper rev-
ocation.  To that point, the defendant has now had the opportunity to show 
 
 160 It should be noted that the Court has wavered on whether probation revocation hearings, which 
are arguably similar to bail revocation hearings in certain respects, are a critical stage sufficient to 
make counsel compulsory.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786–90 (1973) (finding that, 
depending on the circumstances of an individual case, most revocation hearings do not require 
counsel).  In Gagnon, however, the Court thought that the presence of a probation officer, as well as 
the often open-and-shut nature of most of the probation proceedings, made the majority of proba-
tion revocation hearings something less than adversarial.  Id. at 787–89.  This is unlike bail revoca-
tion proceedings which are both adversarial in nature and often require complex arguments.  None-
theless, Gagnon was unwilling to hold that counsel was optional in all probation revocation hearings 
because “the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting 
his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or cross-exam-
ining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.”  Id. at 786–87.  
These considerations should similarly apply to bail revocation proceedings, where defendants ad-
ditionally do not have the luxury of a probation officer who can, in the right circumstances, advo-
cate on their behalf.   
 161 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 157, at 18 (“One reason that the participation of a defense attorney 
makes such a difference is that he ‘can bring relevant facts about his client’s background to the 
judge’s attention.’” (citation omitted)).   
 162 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE 
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 123 (2008) (arguing that a defendant who violates the law time and time 
again may deserve some form of increased punishment). 
 163 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 396 A.2d 134, 138 (Vt. 1978) (placing the revocation of a defendant’s pre-
trial release within the discretion of the trial judge). 
 164 See Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S 15, 17 (1967) (finding a single, brief incident of tardiness without 
a record of other misconduct had “the appearance and effect of punishment rather than of an order 
designed solely to facilitate the trial”). 
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that he is not a flight risk by attending any court hearings in the interim, and 
has also had the opportunity to show he is not a danger to the community by 
avoiding being re-arrested on a substantive offense during the pretrial period.   
3.  Judges Have Many Options in Considering Pretrial Release Conditions 
Bail decisions are more of an art than a science.  Judges take into consid-
eration the flight risk and danger to the community posed by a particular 
defendant when deciding whether to detain or release them.  After coming 
to a relative conclusion, the judge must then consider whether there are re-
lease conditions that, despite the defendant’s apparent propensity for flight 
or danger, can nonetheless assure the appearance of the defendant and the 
safety of the community.165  In doing so, the judge has a multitude of condi-
tions to consider imposing. 
With the advent and advances of electronic monitoring, the flight risk of 
a defendant has become an increasingly inadequate justification for refusing 
to release most defendants pretrial.  Cutting-edge electronic monitoring in 
the United States utilizes GPS tracking to record the movements of defend-
ants.166  These devices provide real-time updates on the location of defend-
ants within up to a ten-meter radius.167  The effectiveness of these systems 
appears promising,168 and they have the potential to be at least as economical 
as detention or bail.169  While electronic monitoring may not completely ex-
tinguish flight risk, it serves as a significant reason to discount flight as a jus-
tification for detaining the average defendant. 
For dangerousness, release conditions are typically provided by statute.170  
They vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but at bottom the release condi-
tions are meant to counteract the cause of the defendant’s dangerousness.171  
For example, if a defendant’s anger provided the spark for the charged of-
fense, and the judge was worried that it would resurface if he were released 
pretrial, the judge may order the defendant to attend anger management 
counseling.  Similar examples abound: Courts may order a defendant to stay 
 
 165 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012) (“If, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition 
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and 
the safety of . . . the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person . . . .”). 
 166 Wiseman, supra note 88, at 1366–67. 
 167 Id. at 1367. 
 168 See id. at 1370–72 (praising electronic monitoring as a potential replacement to money bail, but 
admitting that further empirical study is required to be sure). 
 169 See id. at 1372–74 (finding that, depending on the rigor of the monitoring, electronic monitoring 
has the potential to be cheaper than pretrial detention, but that, once again, further investigation 
is necessary). 
 170 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 171 See Karnow, supra note 16, at 12 (characterizing certain bail conditions as being set in order to 
“confront the underlying cause of offenses”). 
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away from certain individuals if they are concerned that contact with those 
people may erupt in violence,172 or refrain from possessing weapons if they 
fear that such possession could further destructive behavior.173  If a defendant 
has a habit of getting angry and violent when consuming alcohol, a court 
may order the defendant to refrain from drinking.174  Similarly, a defendant 
can be ordered to undergo certain medical, psychological, or psychiatric 
treatment to pull him or her out of treatable violent behavior.175  These are 
only a few of the many tools judges have in their arsenal to combat a defend-
ant’s dangerousness. 
These are all options a defendant likely has no idea exist, and even less 
likely is the prospect of him being able to effectively persuade the court to 
order them in his particular case.  Providing the defendant with counsel at his 
revocation proceeding should decrease the incidence of overbroad bail con-
ditions by providing the court with adversarial testing, defendant-specific 
facts, and creative solutions to prevent flight and dangerousness.  Courts pre-
sented with a second chance to make an accurate assessment of a defendant’s 
specific flight risk and potential danger to the community should not rely too 
heavily on conditions untested by the adversarial process, but should evaluate 
the defendant’s need for pretrial detention in light of the circumstances pre-
sented at his revocation hearing.  This does not mean that the defendant will 
be released in every circumstance.  Indeed, there may very well be violations 
that indicate that this defendant is clearly a flight risk, or is clearly a danger to 
the community.  In such cases, courts should revoke a defendant’s bail, but it 
should do so based upon the record before it, not on the reliance of a previous 
proceeding in which the defendant was at a procedural disadvantage. 
B.  Minimizing Time Spent in Pretrial Detention: The Rocket Docket 
Even if a defendant’s bail is revoked as opposed to modified, other 
measures to ensure that the revocation does not work to induce an innocent 
guilty plea are worthy of consideration.  Accelerating the defendant’s trial 
date and preventing him from having to languish in prison for an extended 
period of time is one possible way to minimize the pressure to plead guilty.  
Courts possess inherent powers to control their dockets and their calendars, 
 
 172 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(v).  This restriction can be enforced by electronic monitoring, 
allowing the government to recoup on the benefits of electronic monitoring twice.  See Lauryn P. 
Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 837, 896 (2016) (finding 
that electronic monitoring can be used to both prevent a defendant’s disappearance as well as en-
sure defendants abide by stay-away orders). 
 173 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii). 
 174 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(ix). 
 175 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(x). 
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and accelerating a trial date is squarely within the control of the trial court.176   
A judge’s acceleration decision can effectively be exercised at a number 
of points during the course of a criminal case.  When a defendant is deciding 
to plead guilty on the heels of a bail revocation, accelerating the trial date at 
the plea colloquy seems especially apt.  As discussed earlier, a guilty plea must 
be freely and voluntarily made.177  During the colloquy, a defendant will be 
asked whether his plea is voluntary.178  Inquiring as to whether the defendant 
is pleading guilty because of the perceived burdens of a prolonged pretrial 
detention will encourage a true guilty plea to defendants trying to delay the 
inevitable, while at the same time safeguarding against an innocent plea in-
duced by pretrial detention.179   
1.  Objections to an Accelerated Trial Date 
Of course, an accelerated trial date may not be workable in every case.  
It would surely do a defendant no good to have his trial date moved up only 
for defense counsel to be unprepared for trial.180  In fact, a conviction secured 
in the face of an unprepared defense would run the risk of being invali-
dated.181  On the other hand, if the defendant was merely resisting a guilty 
 
 176 See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is inci-
dental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket 
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”); McDonald v. Goldstein, 
79 N.Y.S.2d 690, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (rejecting the District Attorney’s argument that control 
over the prosecution of crime included control over the trial calendar); ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPEEDY TRIAL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES § 12-4.5(a) 
(3d ed. 2006) (“Control over the trial calendar, and over all other calendars on which a case may 
be placed, should be vested in the court.”); FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURT 
§ 7.3, at 64 (2008) (“It is well settled that courts have substantial inherent powers to control their 
calendars and to supervise the conduct of litigation as long as they do not deprive parties of their 
fundamental constitutional rights . . . .”). 
 177 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1969) (requiring pleas to be voluntarily made); see 
also supra Part III.B. 
 178 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
 179 This could be as simple as asking whether a defendant has discussed with his attorney the possibility 
of accelerating his trial date, and whether that option is one he would like to explore.  Requiring 
defense attorneys to advise clients on the consequences and alternatives of guilty pleas is nothing 
new.  See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010) (requiring defense attorneys to 
advise their clients on the possible immigration consequences of their guilty plea prior to pleading 
guilty). 
 180 Such a result would be inconsistent with the whole purpose of accelerating the trial date in the first 
place: to prevent factors other than guilt to work towards a conviction. 
 181 See United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1979) (“A plea entered because counsel is 
unprepared for trial is involuntary.”); Ballard v. Maggio, 554 F.2d 1247, 1250–51 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(remanding Ballard’s habeas petition for a hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel because a 
lower state court had expressed concern over defense counsel’s preparedness).  If a plea can be 
made involuntary because of defense counsel’s unpreparedness, then a conviction should similarly 
be able to be overturned if the defendant can show that counsel’s lack of preparation worked to 
prejudice his defense under Strickland v. Washington.  466. U.S 668, 681–82 (1984).   
Oct. 2017] PLEADING FOR FREEDOM 165 
plea because pretrial release gave him little incentive to do so,182 the fact that 
the game is up and he is facing either a prolonged period of pretrial detention 
or a fast-approaching trial date may prompt him to recognize the inevitable, 
“acknowledge his guilt, and . . . realiz[e] whatever potential there may be for 
rehabilitation.”183  A guilty defendant will obtain minimal benefit from being 
informed of the possibility that his trial date may be moved up if a trial is 
likely to bring about a conviction in any event.184   
Objections to an accelerated trial date by the prosecution, however, war-
rant less concern.  Lack of preparation or case immaturity is a poor excuse 
to delay trying a case or keep a defendant in pretrial detention longer than 
necessary.185  If the prosecution believes detaining the defendant is in the 
public’s best interest, they should protect the community by obtaining a con-
viction, not by drawing out the pretrial process.  Even assuming there is suf-
ficient reason to believe the defendant is a flight risk or may pose a danger to 
the community, if the burdens of pretrial detention have the defendant pre-
pared to plead guilty, then the prosecution should shoulder the responsibility 
of either trying their case or dismissing it.186  This does not mean that the 
defendant should simply be released; it only requires the prosecution to ob-
tain a conviction before they can detain the defendant any longer.   
2.  Preparing the Parties for Trial 
In order to responsibly expedite a trial date, judges should get involved 
early to minimize the chance a party comes to trial unprepared.  While set-
ting a trial date that will not be deferred can be an important part of running 
 
 182 See TASK FORCE ON DELAY REDUCTION & CASE MGMT., GUIDELINES FOR BEST PRACTICES IN 
DELAY REDUCTION & CASE MGMT. 5 (2004), https://www.lasc.org/la_judicial_entities/Judi-
cial_Council/Delay_Guidelines.pdf (“Delay frequently is defense oriented, to put off the inevita-
ble.”). 
 183 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).   
 184 On the other hand, if a guilty defendant proceeds to an accelerated trial date and is acquitted, the 
government has failed to carry its burden.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (requiring 
the prosecution to prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 185 Cf. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015) (“A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued 
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a convic-
tion.”).  Scheduling issues with fact or expert witnesses, or a significant change in circumstance, 
however, may warrant reconsideration of how quickly a case should be accelerated.  Even in such 
cases, the amount of time spent in pretrial detention should be minimized to the extent possible. 
 186 In Philadelphia, Municipal Court judges apply their own pressures on prosecutors to try cases ex-
pediently.  During my summer at the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, the prosecution 
would, absent extenuating circumstances, be given three opportunities to try their case.  If they 
were not ready on the first trial listing, they would receive a continuance.  If they were not ready a 
second time, they would be given another continuance, but the case would be marked “must be 
tried.”  If on the third listing they were still not prepared, the presiding judge would typically dismiss 
the case for lack of prosecution.   
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an efficient docket,187 being able to accelerate a trial date takes more than 
simply setting a date and keeping to it.  Instead, deciding on a robust and 
firm pretrial schedule will ensure the parties are prepared for trial, and pro-
vides judges with flexibility to move the trial date up if needed.188   
An efficient pretrial period starts with ensuring that the prosecution’s dis-
covery responsibilities are carried out rapidly, and are regularly supple-
mented when necessary.189  Turning over this information as quickly as pos-
sible encourages preparation for both parties.  Defense counsel, of course, 
learns of the nature of the evidence against her client, and receives the infor-
mation needed to prepare the defendant’s case.  The prosecutor is forced to 
gather his file and take a hard look at the evidence that will be used to prove 
his case.  To facilitate the pretrial period, a scheduling conference may be 
necessary.190  Here, any obstacles the parties have encountered during the 
pretrial process can be discussed, and any pending motions can be sched-
uled.191   
These procedures are best practices for all cases, and they are but a few 
examples of how courts can ensure an efficient pretrial process that results in 
the parties being prepared for trial.  The implementation of these techniques 
is of increased significance when a defendant’s case has survived long enough 
to see the defendant released on bail, and then have it revoked some time 
later.  Of course, there is no way to know for certain which cases will be 
protracted at their outset, and once the opportunity is lost there is only so 
much that can be done to prepare an unprepared counsel for trial at the 
back-end.  Ultimately, the decision whether to accelerate a trial date lies 
within the discretion of the trial judge.192  It is likely that a case that lasts to 
see a defendant’s bail revoked has seen many opportunities to ensure that 
both counsel are prepared for trial.  Hopefully the pretrial process has pro-
ceeded in a fashion that permits a trial date to be moved up if the situation 
presents itself.   
Reconsidering the conditions of the defendant’s bail and providing a po-
tential opportunity to minimize the amount of time spent detained provide 
 
 187 See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size 
Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 399 (2010) (“[I]t is important that once the dates and 
limitations [for trial] are decided upon, they be kept firm, except for very good cause shown.”). 
 188 See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPEEDY TRIAL & TIMELY RESOLUTION OF 
CRIMINAL CASES § 12-4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006) (describing pretrial procedures for an “effective 
overall criminal caseflow”). 
 189 See id. at § 12-4.3(a)–(d), (g) (outlining what elements constitute “effective overall criminal caseflow”).  
Much of this information can be turned over before the defendant’s initial appearance.  Id. at § 12-
4.3(g) cmt. 
 190 Id. at § 12-4.3(i). 
 191 Id. at § 12-4.3(i)(1)–(2) and § 12.-4.3(i) cmt. 
 192 See TRIAL MGMT. STANDARDS 1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992) (opining that the trial judge is in the 
best position to see that trials remain an opportunity for litigants to effectively present their case to 
a trier of fact).   
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two safety nets to prevent pretrial detention from working to produce the 
conviction of an innocent defendant.  Implemented together, these two pro-
cedural safeguards can provide realistic protection of innocent defendants 
while still preserving a functioning criminal justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
Pretrial detention can be used as a legitimate tool to further the mean-
ingful regulatory goals of Congress—namely, ensuring an accused’s presence 
at trial and preventing him from committing crimes while released pending 
trial.  It also has the propensity, however, to induce a defendant to plead 
guilty despite his innocence.  While a prosecutor who intentionally uses pre-
trial detention as a punitive means to induce a guilty plea has violated the 
defendant’s due process rights, the analysis is much more nuanced when it is 
done inadvertently.  The fact that pretrial detention induces a defendant to 
plead guilty does not necessarily mean that plea violated the Constitution.  
Even still, further steps can be taken to ensure a measure meant for purely 
regulatory purposes does not become punitive by working to convict inno-
cent defendants.  The pressures from pretrial detention are real, and they 
have real downstream consequences for those forced to sit in jail awaiting the 
determination of their guilt or innocence.  It is incumbent upon all members 
of the criminal justice system to ensure that innocent defendants are not co-
erced into pleading guilty.   
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